Models of measurement for quantum fields and for classical continuous
  random fields by Morgan, Peter
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
07
16
5v
1 
 2
4 
Ju
l 2
00
6
Models of measurement for quantum fields and
for classical continuous random fields1
Peter Morgan†
Yale University
peter.w.morgan@yale.edu
Abstract. A quantum field model for an experiment describes thermal fluctuations explicitly and
quantum fluctuations implicitly, whereas a comparable continuous random field model would de-
scribe both thermal and quantum fluctuations explicitly. An ideal classical measurement does not
affect the results of later measurements, in contrast to ideal quantum measurements, but we can
describe the consequences of the thermal and quantum fluctuations of classically non-ideal mea-
surement apparatuses explicitly. Some details of continuous random fields and of Bell inequalities
for random fields will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, I wondered what the differences, similarities, and the relationship, if
any, might be between quantum fields and continuous random fields. I had seen that
equilibrium states of continuous random fields at non-zero temperature have nonlocal
correlations, as quantum fields do, and I thought naïvely that this was enough to let us
construct useful models. Until three years ago I called continuous random fields by the
name that seemed natural to me, "classical statistical fields", but I discovered then that
mathematicians and physicists are accustomed to using the name "continuous random
fields", and I now use that name.
I still consider that continuous random fields give an effective way to understand
quantum field theory, but they are not a very effective replacement for quantum field
theory. The relationship between quantum fields and continuous random fields partic-
ularly depends on the significantly different measurement algebras of the two theories,
which I discuss below. Thus I do not refer to continuous random fields as a sub-quantum
theory, which I think indicates a stronger relationship to quantum field theory than can
be sustained in the face of the measurement theory differences.
The next two sections discuss some basics of continuous random fields and the
derivation of Bell inequalities. The assumptions that have to be made to derive Bell
inequalities are generally not satisfied by random fields. More detail may be found in
[1] and [2]. The later sections on measurement further develop this way to understand
quantum field theory.
1 This article will be submitted to the Proceedings of the Conference on the Foundations of Probability
and Physics-4, Växjö, 2006. If it is published, it will be found at http://proceedings.aip.org/proceedings.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CONTINUOUS RANDOM FIELDS
A random field is a very general object, no more than an indexed set of random
variables[3], which means that random fields subsume almost all probabilistic physics.
If the index set has additional structure, which in physics is particularly likely to be
a space-time structure, then that additional structure will be inherited by the random
field. A continuous random field can be defined as a random-variable-valued tempered
distribution,
χf =
∫
χ(x) f (x)d4x. (1)
Very similarly, a quantum field is an operator-valued tempered distribution,
ˆφf =
∫
ˆφ(x) f (x)d4x. (2)
Both the quantum field and the continuous random field are linear maps from a Schwartz
space of functions[4, §II.1.2], into a ⋆-algebra of linear operators and a space of random
variables respectively. The definition given here for a continuous random field is not
the only one possible, for example see [5], but here the intention is to see how closely
a continuous random field can parallel a quantum field, so of course we will follow
the quantum field structure closely when possible. A classical random field can be
formulated even more closely in parallel with quantum field theory as a commutative
quantum field. A lattice as an index set might also be useful, but will not be used here.
The measurement represented by ˆφf in quantum field theory is compatible with ˆφg
when the functions f and g have space-like separated supports2, whereas the measure-
ment represented by χf is always compatible with χg, no matter what the space-time
relationships between f and g.3
The vacuum sector of the quantized Klein-Gordon field can be presented using just
the following two equations: [
ˆφf , ˆφg
]
= (g, f )− ( f ,g), (3)
〈0|eiλ ˆφ f |0〉= e− 12 λ 2( f , f ), (4)
where (g, f ) is a Hermitian inner product:
(g, f ) = h¯
∫ d4k
(2pi)4
2piδ (kµkµ −m2)θ(k0) g˜∗(k) ˜f (k)
= h¯
∫ d3k
(2pi)3
g˜∗(k) ˜f (k)
2
√
k2 +m2
. (5)
2 From now on functions will be taken from a Schwartz space of functions.
3 Note that a continuous random field is not a C∞ classical field. In (very) heuristic terms, a continuous
random field that has non-trivial fluctuations can be thought of at a point as almost always ±∞ (so
definitely not a regular continuous field!), but arranged just so that when we take a weighted average
over a finite region, where the weight function is taken from a Schwartz space, we get a finite number. A
respectable definition of course does not mention infinity.
The first equation fixes the algebraic structure of the quantized Klein-Gordon field,
while the second fixes the vacuum state. Taken with the linear structure ˆφ(λ f+µg) =
λ ˆφf + µ ˆφg, they are enough to generate the Wightman functions. I keep to free fields
because renormalization complicates matters in ways that I believe not to be essential,
notwithstanding the usual physicist’s cry that they want to see explicit calculations for an
interacting quantum field theory. All that is needed is any way to generate the Wightman
functions for an interacting theory, which can be any Lorentz invariant formalism,
preferably better defined than a singular Lagrangian formalism (it is not to be forgotten
that there is no rigorous interacting model of the Wightman axioms, which makes the
Wightman axioms open to question).
The vacuum sector of an "equivalent" random field can be presented as:〈
e
iλ χf
〉
0
= e−
1
2 λ 2( f , f ) (6)
in which all measurements are mutually compatible. This uses the same exponential that
is used for the quantized Klein-Gordon field as the characteristic function of a classi-
cal probability density. The generated joint probability density for a set of observables{
χf1,χf2, ...,χfn
}
is the same as for the corresponding observables
{
ˆφf1, ˆφf2, ..., ˆφfn
}
if the quantum observables are mutually compatible — that is, essentially, if the quan-
tum observables have space-like separated supports. For non-vacuum states we generally
cannot simply adopt the state over the quantized Klein-Gordon algebra for an "equiv-
alent" continuous random field, but positive-definite Wigner functions are empirically
adequate for any system that we observe using only mutually compatible measurements,
and if we include enough of the experimental apparatus this can give an adequate clas-
sical model for an experiment.
It is interesting to compare the Wigner function of the vacuum state of the quantized
Klein-Gordon field with the equilibrium state of the classical Klein-Gordon field at finite
temperature. The Wigner function at time t is the inverse functional fourier transform of
〈0|ei ˆφ ft |0〉= 〈0|exp
[
i
∫
ˆφ(t,x) ft(x)d3x
]
|0〉= exp
[
−h¯
∫
˜f ∗t (k) ˜ft(k)
4
√
k2 +m2
d3k
(2pi)3
]
; (7)
we use ft(x) and Φt(x) as the transform variables of this Gaussian exponential to obtain
ρ0[Φt ] N= exp
[
−1h¯
∫
˜Φ∗t (k)
√
k2 +m2 ˜Φt(k)
d3k
(2pi)3
]
, (8)
where N= denotes equality up to (infinite) normalization and we take Φt(x) to be complex
as a simple way to extend the configuration space to the phase space. From a classical
perspective, the square root here is nonlocal, in the sense that a classical dynamics would
have to be nonlocal for the Gibbs probability density to take this exponential form.
The nonlocality drops off exponentially, however, making the square root classically
no more problematic than the heat equation — it’s a Lorentz invariant heat kernel. From
a quantum field perspective this analysis is not pertinent; there is no nonlocality because
we cannot send messages faster than light using the measurements that are available
within the Klein-Gordon quantum field theory, and the introduction of the concept of a
classical Gibbs probability distribution is not consistent with the general principles of
quantum field theory. Even if we restrict ourselves to concepts of quantum field theory,
however, Planck’s constant controls the amplitude of quantum fluctuations, just as kBT
controls the amplitude of thermal fluctuations, so that we can properly talk about and
distinguish between quantum and thermal fluctuations.
The equilibrium state of the classical Klein-Gordon random field at temperature T is:
ρC[Xt ] N=e−βH[Xt ] = exp
[
− 1
kBT
∫
˜X
∗
t (k)12
(
k2 +m2
)
˜Xt(k)
d3k
(2pi)3
]
. (9)
There are three obvious changes from the quantum case: (1) there’s no square root;
(2) Planck’s constant becomes kBT (with energy units instead of action units); (3) the
Lorentz symmetry is broken (the classical Klein-Gordon dynamics is Lorentz invariant,
but the Gibbs probability density as an initial condition is not; for a general Lorentz
invariant dynamics, those for which the Gibbs probability density is Lorentz invariant
are singled out).
We can also compute the Wigner function of the equilibrium state of the quantized
Klein-Gordon field at temperature T from the characteristic function
Tr
[
e−β ˆHei ˆφ ft
]
, ˆH =
∫
a†(k)a(k)
(
k2 +m2
) d3k
(2pi)3
, (10)
leading to
ρT [Φt ] N= exp
[
−1h¯
∫ d3k
(2pi)3
tanh
(
h¯
√
k2 +m2
2kBT
)
˜Φ∗t (k)
√
k2 +m2 ˜Φt(k)
]
(11)
The tanh factor makes the integrand close to the classical thermal state at low wave
numbers (where tanh is close to linear), and close to the vacuum state at high wave
numbers (where tanh is close to 1).
We can therefore distinguish precisely between quantum fluctuations and thermal
fluctuations — using purely conventional quantum field computation — in a way that
allows us to model quantum and thermal fluctuations classically in the same way as we
already model thermal fluctuations. We can achieve as much empirical adequacy with
a classical model insofar as quantum phenomena are caused by quantum and thermal
fluctuations rather than by our contingent measurements.
BELL INEQUALITIES FOR RANDOM FIELDS
I argue at length in [2] that Bell inequalities cannot in general be derived for random
fields, so that the violation of Bell inequalities by experiment does not rule out random
field models.
Bell describes an experiment statistically using random variables A and a representing
measurement results and measurement settings associated with a space-time region RA
and similarly in a space-like separated space-time region RB [6, Chapter 7], resulting in
an experimentally established joint probability p(A,a,B,b). Of course we only actually
have statistics from an experiment, but we generally take probability densities to be
effective models for statistics. The probability density p(A,a,B,b) is no more than an
initial condition for a random field model, which (partially) determines what the initial
conditions of the random field must have been in the past and will be in the future.
Initial conditions are totally unconstrained by classical physics: if they are unlikely they
have higher free energy, but then they just need more experimental effort to set up.
Experiments that violate Bell inequalities are quite hard to set up — they take a lot
of free energy — so it is somewhat disingenuous of Bell, and many others since, to say
pejoratively that it requires a "conspiracy" [6, Chapter 12, p. 103] for classical physics to
obtain a violation of the Bell inequalities, insofar as this suggests that the experimenter
had little to do with setting up favourable conditions for obtaining the experimental
result.
A quantum field state presented as a Wigner quasi-probability over phase space at
the time of a measurement determines the Wigner quasi-probability over phase space at
future and past times to precisely the same extent as a classical random field, so there
is exactly as much "conspiracy" in a quantum field model as there is in a continuous
random field model. We should not conclude that quantum field theory is unreasonable,
but that a continuous random field theory is as reasonable.
To derive Bell inequalities for a random field, Bell introduces a priori constraints
on what the initial conditions in the past are allowed to have been. Bell’s constraints
are based on a notion of common cause that is well-founded for a classical particle
model, but is completely unmotivated for a random field. For a classical particle model,
two particles come from a single source, which is the common cause of two correlated
events. For a random field (and for a quantum field), the correlations of the field at the
time of measurement evolve from correlations at earlier times. There is a distributed
cause, not a common cause.
Bell also constrains the dynamics to be local, which has generally been seen as the
only way to satisfy Lorentz invariance. The kernel
√
k2 +m2 is therefore forbidden
because it’s nonlocal, even though it’s a Lorentz invariant, exponentially decreasing
nonlocality that a sensible classical random field theory ought to be comfortable enough
with — or anyway as comfortable as we are with the quantum field that generates the
same probability density over the phase space.
Random field theory constrained this much is a straw man of a theory. The violation
of Bell inequalities can reasonably (though not without any qualification) be taken to
show that there are no simply localized particles that would justify an assumption that
there are pervasive common causes, but the violation does not rule out a random field
model.
An alternative discussion of the Bell inequalities asserts that Bell inequalities are
about consistency in the sense of probability theory and measurement incompatibility,
not about Einstein locality (for example, [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], and see Karl Hess and Wal-
ter Philipp in this volume for a historical discussion of papers in the statistics literature
going back to the 1950’s). If we construct probability distributions p(A1,B1), p(A2,B1),
p(A2,B2), and p(A2,B1), where A1 and A2 correspond to two incompatible measure-
ment settings in RA and similarly for B1 and B2 in RB, we cannot in general construct
a quadrivariate probability distribution p(A1,A2,B1,B2) that has the post-selected prob-
ability distributions p(A1,B1), p(A2,B1), p(A2,B2), and p(A2,B1) as marginals. A clas-
sical description that has p(A,a,B,b) as a marginal, however, is not ruled out, because
here there is no post-selection on incompatible measurement settings. That is, classi-
cal and quantum measurement algebras are theoretically distinct but empirically equally
adequate formalisms for the description of experiments.
The experimental data idealized as a probability distribution p(A,a,B,b) from a sin-
gle set of compatible measurements cannot compel us to use a non-positive Wigner
quasi-probability over the phase space of a quantum field theory as the only empirically
adequate quantum state. Any probability distribution over a larger phase space that has
p(A,a,B,b) as its marginal over A,a,B,b is as empirically adequate as any putative quan-
tum mechanically non-trivial (non-positive) Wigner function. We can only be forced to
use a non-positive Wigner function if we make at least two incompatible measurements
of identical subensembles of an ensemble of systems (and the measurement results are
provably incompatible with a positive Wigner function).
A random field model is contextual insofar as it includes apparatus degrees of free-
dom, but this is not contextuality in the usually pejorative sense that particle properties
depend on what apparatus is used. There are no particles that have precise properties in
random field models. We have to include the measurement apparatus in models when-
ever necessary because of nontrivial effects of thermal or quantum fluctuations, but as a
practical matter of calculation we avoid introducing fluctuations whenever possible.
MEASUREMENT FOR QUANTUM FIELDS
It is well known that there is no consistent measurement theory for quantum field theory.
Suppose we carry out a number of measurements described by operators ˆOi on an en-
semble of systems described by a density operator ρˆ . The expected experimental results
are given by quantum theory as Tr[ ρˆ ˆOi ]. For quantum theory to work as an empiri-
cal theory, measured systems and measurement systems must be manifestly separable
in practice — there has to be something that is described by ρˆ and something distinct
that is described by the ˆOi. A much stronger requirement on quantum theory, which is
required if we are to claim more for quantum field theory than empirical adequacy, is
to insist that measured systems and measurement systems are manifestly and precisely
separable in principle.
From this elementary point of view, it is very clear in the formalism of quantum
mechanics that a quantum field state is not changed by using different ideal measurement
devices, in the sense that the expected results of measurements described by operators ˆOi
are not Tr[ ρˆi ˆOi ], with a different quantum field state as well as a different measurement
operator for every measurement. If that were the case, we could never determine the
density operators ρˆi by measurement.
It is a peculiarity of quantum field theory that a measurement apparatus that imple-
ments ˆOi is so far idealized as to be completely outside space-time (an external descrip-
tion of measurement). The quantum field state ρˆ describes all space-time, with no room
for a measurement apparatus.
In contrast, from a point of view in which a measurement apparatus is explicitly mod-
elled as in space-time (an internal description of measurement), the measurement ap-
paratus is in principle not separable from the system it interacts with, because of the
Reeh-Schlieder theorem. When we discuss subsystems in quantum mechanics we gen-
erally use partial trace operations to construct states and POV measurements from states
and measurements of a larger system (for example, see [13]), but in quantum field the-
ory we instead discuss different states in the same Hilbert space, which effectively model
different whole universes. There is an in principle contradiction in the logical structure
of quantum field theory, if we want to include both internal and external descriptions of
measurement in the formalism (and quantum theory has always abrogated to itself the
right to place the Heisenberg cut anywhere convenient). This in principle contradiction
does not affect the possibility of using quantum field theory as an empirically adequate
theory, because separation in an effective theory sense is generally possible, but it should
qualify our support for quantum mechanics as a fundamental theory.
In practice, we model experiments by introducing a quantum field state and operator
descriptions for the measurements, in the hope that such an idealized model will be
empirically adequate. If we can’t achieve empirical adequacy with a simple such model
because thermal fluctuations have a significant effect on experimental results, we can
model the measurement device and the "measured system" explicitly using a single
quantum field state, then a more remote measurement device is modelled by an operator.
This style of modelling using quantum field theory falls far short of the claims generally
made for the universality of quantum field theory.
MEASUREMENTS FOR RANDOM FIELDS
Ideal classical measurements do not affect other measurements or the system they mea-
sure. We routinely reduce the temperature of experimental apparatus to very close to
absolute zero, so that it is plausible to idealize an experiment as being carried out ac-
tually at absolute zero, whereas we cannot reduce quantum fluctuations, Planck’s con-
stant, to an arbitrarily small level. When thermal fluctuations are significant and cannot
be reduced, we have to model the thermal properties of an experiment explicitly, so we
introduce successively more careful thermal models until we achieve an empirically ad-
equate description. Equally, when quantum fluctuations are significant, and presumably
cannot be reduced to an arbitrarily small level, then all we have to do in a random field
approach is explicitly model the quantum fluctuations of the measurement device and
its interactions with the measured system. A random field model that explicitly takes
quantum fluctuations into account is not much more difficult than a quantum field model
if thermal fluctuations already have to be taken into account.
Even if we cannot reduce quantum fluctuations, we can imagine what results we
would obtain if we could. It is after all quite common to think of physical systems from
what is essentially a God’s eye view of the world, in which the usual rules of action and
reaction are suspended — indeed, as we have seen in the previous section, quantum field
theory as much requires this idealization as does classical physics. Real experiments can
be described with better accuracy by taking progressively more account of actions and
reactions between parts of the experiment, including more apparatus and changing our
God’s eye view as needed.
We can construct random field models from quantum field models by a very simple
procedure. To do so, construct progressively larger quantum field models, including
more and more experimental apparatus, until a positive-definite Wigner function is
empirically adequate. That’s our random field model. By construction, the
dynamics of the random field are the same as the dynamics of the quantum field, all
that can be different are the initial conditions, whether probability or quasiprobability
over the phase space. This approach to constructing empirically equivalent random field
models should be distinguished from Arthurs-Kelly type interpretations of positive semi-
definite Husimi functions[14, 15, 13].
DISCRETE MEASUREMENTS
If we’re to think in terms of random fields, we have to be comfortable with thinking of
discrete events as localized thermodynamic events in the field. A discrete event device
is a metastable thermodynamic state that is very carefully tuned as far as possible not to
transition to its registration state (that is, except for its dark rate statistics) whenever
it is effectively isolated. Examples of such devices are CCDs, photographic plates,
semiconductor devices, and bubble chambers4. From a theoretical point of view, truly
thermodynamic transitions can happen in a finite region such as a single crystal of a
photographic plate, because there are effectively infinite degrees of freedom in a finite
region of a continuous random field model.
When a transition to the registration state happens, a feedback process returns the
device to its metastable state as quickly as possible (unless it’s a photographic plate; a
bubble chamber is returned to its metastable state cyclically rather than by feedback).
The dark rate statistics of a discrete event device are generally non-zero for any inter-
esting degree of sensitivity, but a device becomes far more interesting if when it is put
near various plugged-in and turned-on apparatuses, different statistics for transitions to
its registration state are observed. A change of the environment generally changes the
response of a discrete event device, and we are very careful to engineer as large a change
of response as possible for a given change of the environment.
Discrete transition events are a consequence of engineered thermodynamic properties
more than of any discrete structure of the external field. To a great extent, this attitude to
discrete event devices is in tune with Copenhagen-type interpretations, which routinely
enjoin us not to think there is a particle, or at least that a particle has any properties
like position, until a measurement is made, but the approach taken here goes further:
classical experimental apparatus is effectively localized, but between preparation and
discrete event devices there are no point-like objects at all. However, the approach
4 We can get discrete results by observing the spectrum of incandescent sodium atoms, for example, but
this kind of discrete structure does not immediately demonstrate that the world is classically particulate,
whereas it is a commonplace that tracks in bubble chambers are taken to justify "particle" physics.
taken here also stops short of a Copenhagen-type positivism: there is something in our
models, a random field, between the preparation and discrete event devices, and indeed
constituting the whole experiment.
Discrete events are taken here not to represent the arrival of individual particles, but
nonetheless there may be integer invariants of a quantum or random field. As a classical
analogy, the topological equivalence class of a continuous field is a nonlocal discrete
invariant. Comparably, the superselection sector of a quantum field is a nonlocal discrete
invariant.
In this "picture", we can take for a trivial example a loop of paper, with a single twist,
and define the number of particles, one, to be the number of twists in the loop. This
is a topological invariant under continuous deformations of the loop. Suppose that the
dynamics of the loop of paper are such that at zero fluctuations the twist is effectively
quite localized, so that we can pragmatically identify where the twist is on the loop.
We might then identify the particle as being where the twist is, but we would have to
recognize that the number of particles is defined as the number of twists in the loop,
and where the twist is located can be defined only pragmatically and only if there are no
quantum or thermal fluctuations. Once we introduce quantum and thermal fluctuations
and continuous random fields, however, there is to my knowledge no developed theory of
discrete structure for random fields comparable to topological and superselection sectors
for classical continuous fields and quantum fields.
In three-dimensional space, the simplest candidate for a topologically nontrivial struc-
ture is perhaps the Shankar monopole ([16]; see [17] for a graphic presentation), but
because there are several significant quantum numbers associated with superselection
sectors of the standard model, the Shankar monopole can only be a toy model.
To consider a double-slit experiment with electrons, when the preparation device is
turned on, some of the substance of the preparation device "boils off" into the surround-
ing space, where the evolution of the field is more-or-less linear, and we can effectively
think of the field in terms of simple classical waves, passing through the slits and in-
terfering in the classical wave-like way. All through that process, invariants of the field
must be conserved, so that we can more-or-less legitimately talk of the total number of
electrons in the whole apparatus, but we cannot as legitimately talk of ideas that are not
well-defined such as the number of electrons in the preparation device, in the discrete
event device, or in between, nor of the time when an electron left the preparation device
or arrived at a discrete event device (even if we see a discrete event, which is perhaps
better thought of as part of the device statistics in the presence of a specific preparation
device, not as caused by a single electron). Insofar as we might reasonably talk of how
many electrons there are between the preparation and the discrete event device, to some
pragmatic approximation, we can generally only talk of them as contained in the whole
space. There are no localized electrons between the preparation and discrete event de-
vices. Because a discrete event device that has been tuned so that its transition statistics
change in the presence of an electron field has been placed beyond the slits, we ob-
serve discrete events, but because the electron field is different in different places, partly
because of interference, the discrete event statistics are different in different places.
Note that it is only because [2] shows that random fields do not satisfy assumptions
that would allow us to derive Bell inequalities that it is possible to argue in these vague
terms for such a model. This model for localized and non-localized particles is certainly
vague, but it is not much more vague than descriptions of measurement that ignore
the engineering of discrete event devices and claims that the standard model describes
localized matter through confinement.
SPECULATIONS ABOUT GRAVITY
Because we have been using Fourier transforms extensively, constructing a "random
field gravity" is mathematically no easier than quantum gravity, but conceptually it may
perhaps be advantageous to keep everything classical.
A striking consequence of taking a more classical view of the world is that if we
suppose that quantum fluctuations vary from place to place, it is classically natural
to wonder whether a Poincaré disc view might be a useful analogy[18, Chapter IV],
which would suggest that a variation of Planck’s constant would be indistinguishable
from a variation of the metric. On this view, it is only because we include variations of
the metric in our models that Planck’s constant is a constant. Zahid Zakir, in a Nelson
trajectories approach, comes to essentially this conclusion[19].
On a classical random field view, it also makes little sense to quantize gravity if it is
conceptually related to quantum theory as an intimately related collective phenomenon
— if the light metric is not merely affected by quantum fluctuations. A classical analogy
with sound suggests that the light metric might be as irrelevant as a dynamical variable
below some critical length as the sound metric is irrelevant at the atomic scale. This
seems quite different from suggestions that the light metric structure becomes, for
example, foam-like below certain scales, presupposing that the light metric is well-
defined at arbitrarily small scales.
CONCLUSION
Bell inequalities are always brought out in response to any challenge to quantum the-
ory, but they are of very limited application to random fields. Nonetheless, a random
field model is not a replacement for a Hilbert space model, it is an alternative. Finite-
dimensional Hilbert space models and the Schrödinger equation on a finite-dimensional
phase space will and should continue to be used as very effective models.
Some interpretations of quantum mechanics look a little outrageous (but of course
are not ruled out) if a random field model can be equally empirically adequate, but the
intended point of this research is more that a better understanding of the relationship
between quantum field models and random field models is helpful.
By including enough apparatus in models, we can make a positive-definite Wigner
function empirically adequate, and then interpret it as what we would observe if we
had classically ideal measurement apparatus. This seemingly trivial approach can only
be taken if a very careful understanding of the relationship between the measurement
models of quantum field theory and of continuous random fields is preserved.
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